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Resumo
Islão, Democracia, Diversidade: Algumas Refle-
xões sobre os Levantamentos Populares Árabes
A chamada «Primavera Árabe» surgiu como uma 
enorme surpresa para a maioria dos observadores 
e académicos e, apesar dos seus resultados finais 
ainda serem desconhecidos, o «mundo árabe» não 
voltará a ser o mesmo. Estas revoltas populares 
árabes não foram previstas, mas eram realmente 
imprevisíveis? 
Seja qual for a resposta, as mudanças que ocor-
reram na Tunísia, Egito, Líbia, para não falar no 
Bahrein, Marrocos ou na Síria, mostram claramen-
te que os regimes autoritários não eram - como as 
democracias ocidentais que os apoiaram fizeram 
crer - a melhor e única alternativa ao islamismo. 
Além disso estas revoltas enfatizaram as profundas 
mudanças sociais que resultaram no surgimento 
de novos atores, principalmente mulheres e jovens 
que estiveram na linha da frente. Embora o isla-
mismo tenha dizimado a ideia de uma exceção de-
mocrática árabe, a regulação democrática do plu-
ralismo cultural parece ser um dos desafios mais 
cruciais ao futuro do «mundo árabe».
Abstract
The so called “Arab Spring” came as a huge surprise 
to most observers and scholars and, though its final 
outcomes are still unknown, things will never be the 
same again in the “Arab world”. These Arab popular 
uprisings were not predicted but were they really unpre-
dictable? 
Whatever the answer may be, the changes that took 
place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, not to talk of Bahrain, 
Morocco or Syria, clearly show that authoritarian regi-
mes were not, as the Western democracies which long 
supported them believed, the best and only alternative 
to Islamism. Moreover, these uprisings underline the 
deep social changes resulting into the emergence of new 
actors, and mainly women and youth who were at the 
waterfront of these uprisings. Yet, though the latter have 
wiped out the idea of an Arab exception to democracy, 
the democratic regulation of cultural pluralism appears 






Islam, Democracy, Diversity: 
Some Reflections on the Arab Popular Uprisings
The dramatic changes that have been taking place in the Arab world since Decem-
ber 2010 and the self immolation by fire of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, Tuni-
sia, question once again the role of Islam in these societies. These changes are taking 
place in Muslim societies but is Islam the explanatory variable for them or is it a 
dependent variable tied to social, economic, political or cultural variables? Though 
religion might play an important role in history, it cannot be the central paradigm 
for the study of Muslim societies, unless we consider that these societies are so im-
placably particular and specific that the classic tools of the social sciences would be 
inadequate to analyse and try to understand their development. This, as we know, 
was the position of a form of orientalism and of certain orientalists, Western or 
Arab, all of them were fiercely criticized by Edward Said (2003). 
But even if we consider that Islam as a religion plays a major role in Muslim socie-
ties then it is necessary to keep in mind some methodological if not epistemological 
precautions.
First, for the assumption that there is an inherent incompatibility between Islam 
as a religion and modernity, it is useful to insist on the idea, Max Weber notwi-
thstanding, that there is no religion that is naturally compatible or incompatible 
with modernity. If we consider the Protestant Reformation and counter-Reform 
movements in Europe there is no doubt that they have played a central role in the 
European Renaissance, while, as Tocqueville put it in the 19th Century, Puritanism 
and religious pluralism and freedom were at the heart of American democracy. 
But, at the same time, how to avoid analyses that explain that Nazism was possible 
in Germany partly because it’s holistic nature encountered protestant communita-
rianism (Badie, 1984), a hypothesis that Karl Polanyi (1983), in his book The Great 
Transformation, refutes by explaining that, on the contrary, Nazism results from the 
decomposition of political liberalism which, according to him, historically followed 
the communitarian organization. The conclusion to draw is that, like any religion, 
Islam is a social and historical construct, as likely as such to cope with democracy 
or to inspire the worst theocratic regimes.
Second, and as a consequence, the discussion about the compatibility between Is-
lam and democracy may be philosophically stimulating but it is of little interest 
with regard to a sociological approach to Muslim societies. We could discuss for 
hours the famous principle that Islam is religion and state (al islam din wa dawla) 
with reference to the totalizing dimension of the Islamic law (sharia), without un-
derstanding much about the reality of politics in Muslim societies. To put it diffe-
rently, what we need is a sociology of actors.
Third, while getting at the core of social and not Muslim actors and strategies, it 
remains necessary to avoid being subjugated by any discourse or actor in parti-
cular. To get back to Arab popular uprisings, no one predicted them and most of 
the observers were even amazed by their occurrence. The vocation of the social 
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sciences is not to predict what is going to happen – in any case when social scien-
tists do make predictions, they are most often proven wrong by reality – though, of 
course, their analyses may be useful to policy makers. But one of the reasons why 
the Arab uprisings were so surprising certainly lies in the exaggerated importance 
given by researchers, including myself, and policy makers to the “myth of autho-
ritarian stability” (Gause, 2011) and to Islamism and Islamists. I don’t mean that 
Islamism was invented by researchers or that policy makers’ concern with Islamist 
terrorism and political stability is illegitimate. I mean that not enough attention 
was paid to non Islamist actors and strategies, to those who we may call “ordinary 
Muslims” (Otayek and Soares, 2007). Not enough attention was either drawn to 
secular, liberal or democratic forces in these regions, as if they did not exist. It is 
certainly time now for researchers and policy makers to reconsider their approach 
to Muslim societies. 
Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Arab and Muslim World
The relation between Islam and democracy has fed endless political and scientific 
controversies. As a social scientist, I might accept the proposal that Islam is incom-
patible with democracy proposal as a legitimate hypothesis but not as a statement 
or as an unquestionable truth, in the same way I might accept an alternative hypo-
thesis which would say that Islam is compatible with democracy. But the two hypo-
theses are only hypotheses and need to be argued and confronted with the history 
of Muslim and Arab societies, which many people including leading scientists fail 
to do, thus falling into the trap of culturalism.
This does not mean, of course, that there is not a dramatic lack of democracy in 
many Arab and Muslim countries. Democracy there is the exception while au-
thoritarianism was and remains to a large extent the rule. But what is it about, 
Muslim exceptionalism or Arab exceptionalism to democracy (Robertson, 2004)? 
In other words, is Islam the problem or rather is it the resilience of Arab authori-
tarian regimes, at least until the current popular uprisings? Arab people amount 
to a little more than 330 million out of 1,3 billion Muslims around the world. And 
some of them live under electoral democracies and have been doing so for deca-
des (Turkey, Indonesia, the largest Muslim country by its population in the world, 
Senegal) while others have more recently begun to experiment with democratic 
institutions. Mali, a country predominantly Muslim, was in this situation and 
could be considered as a relative success story until the coup d’Etat of March 21st. 
But even in this case, is Islam responsible for the failure of democracy or is it ra-
ther the incapacity of the Malian state and its international protectors to solve the 
recurring problems in the Northern part of the country and to elaborate adequate 
political and economic solutions to Tuareg claims while fighting against Al Qaeda 
in Maghreb (AQIM)? 
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Muslim exceptionalism or Arab exceptionalism, the crucial question is not the com-
patibility of Islam with democracy, but the exceptional resilience of Arab autho-
ritarian regimes and their capacity to adapt themselves to the international envi-
ronment that emerged after the end of the cold war and the universalization of 
the democratic norm. From this point of view, it is interesting to note that many 
authoritarian Arab regimes appropriated democratic symbols and semantics, and 
proclaimed their adhesion to democracy and the rule of law. In Egypt, the ruling 
party called itself the National Democratic Party and in Tunisia, it called itself the 
Constitutional Democratic Rally. In both countries, the reference to democracy and 
a controlled and limited political pluralism were part of the regimes’ self legitimi-
zing repertoire while they remained deeply authoritarian. The strategies that made 
such resilience possible have been well documented by political scientists but it 
may be useful to briefly get back to the thesis of voluntary servitude. 
According to this explanation, the resilience of Arab authoritarian regimes lied 
and lies in their capacity to command obedience and social consent in exchange 
for security and access to some economic resources allowing consumption and a 
certain level of social welfare. Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia was the paradigmatic 
figure of what social scientists like B. Hibou (2006) and M. Camau and V. Geisser 
(2003) described as the “security pact” considered as the bedrock of Tunisian and 
more broadly Arab authoritarianism. This thesis is interesting for many reasons 
and mainly because it refutes essentialist and culturalist prejudices, and focuses 
on actors and strategies. But to what extent did the focus on obedience and the 
collusions between rulers and the ruled distract from seeing the resentment and 
frustrations lying beneath apparent obedience and consent? To obey is not to ac-
cept; to obey is not to consent. There is an Arab proverb that says nearly this: “The 
hand you cannot break, kiss it and pray for it to break”. What was perceived as 
consent and resignation to tyrannical powers was often in fact dissimulation and a 
social trick. The Arab uprisings prove that Arabs are not by substance extraneous 
to values such as freedom, dignity, equality and democracy the West considers as 
part of its civilization. 
Arab popular uprisings are often said to be democratic transitions. But to talk of 
democratic transitions today is certainly premature. The contestation we observe is 
democratic but democratic contestation does not necessarily lead to a democratic 
transition. Ben Ali, Mubarak and Qaddhafi have been overthrown but democra-
tization is still to come. As has been often the case with Sub-Saharan democratic 
transitions, authoritarian restorations are possible for many reasons and mainly the 
absence of a strong political secular and democratic leadership, a fact that helps to 
explain in large part the rise of Islamists, Annahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brothers 
in Egypt, as the dominant political force. The aim is not to downplay the popular 
uprisings whose political and psychological impact has probably been irreversible 
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in the sense that they have put an end to the culture of fear through which the 
authoritarian regimes had built their domination. It is rather to stress the idea that 
these ongoing uprisings are at the same time civic and political. They are political 
because they called for a change of regime and they are civic because they were ini-
tiated by the civil societies and reflect aspirations for social justice and citizenship 
rights. The concept of civil society is a very controversial one and I am not convin-
ced that it is an operative concept from a scientific point of view. This is the reason 
why it is more relevant to think in terms of social movement and collective action. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Arab uprisings have less to do with the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 than they have to do with the revolutions in Eastern and Central 
Europe after the end of the Soviet Union. The Arab world is of course not Eastern 
or Central Europe but in both cases, civil society played a major role at least in the 
beginning and in both cases the quest for political liberalism is intimately linked 
to social justice and the respect for human dignity. It would be of great help at this 
stage to recall that civic leaders in Eastern Europe like V. Havel and A. Michnik 
conceived the rise of civil society as a way to articulate political liberalism and 
renewed forms of social and economic solidarity (Baker, 1999). This vision, as we 
know, was quickly eclipsed by the triumph of market democracy and neo-libera-
lism. I don’t know if political liberalism will take root in the Arab world or if, like 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, multiparty democracy will be the fig leaf of some kind of a 
neo-authoritarianism. But I am quiet sure that Islamism is absolutely compatible 
with economic and financial neo-liberalism. 
Islamist Electoral Successes
The electoral outcomes of Arab uprisings reflect an amazing paradox: in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Morocco even though the situation there is quiet different from Tunisia 
and Egypt, the Islamist parties have won elections and have been propelled into 
government. But is it truly surprising? The uprisings were unpredictable but is it 
the case with this Islamist wave? Certainly not given the fierce repression of demo-
cratic and secular forces by the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, while systemati-
cally crushing any demand for real democracy, the authoritarian powers cultivated 
a rather ambiguous attitude towards Islamists. On the one hand, they opposed 
them, limiting or merely tolerating their political activities, for example in Moroc-
co, Egypt and Jordan, or trying to eradicate them physically as in Algeria and, to 
some extent, in Tunisia and Syria. But on the other hand, they also developed Is-
lamic rhetoric as proof of their respect for Islamic precepts and their piety, thereby 
legitimizing claims for more Islam in the public sphere and also contributing to the 
diffusion of conservative ideas about and practices of Islam in society. In this sense, 
it might be useful to recall that many of these authoritarian regimes did, at one 
time or another, favour the Islamists in order to neutralize the pressure of leftist or 
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nationalist movements, as did late president Anouar al-Sadate in Egypt when he 
decided to launch his politics of economic liberalization known as Infitah, to get rid 
of the soviet advisers who had been present in Egypt for more than twenty years 
and to oppose the critics of the Nasserist forces.
In the recent years and with the possible exceptions of Algeria and Tunisia, the 
authoritarian regimes seemed to have reached a kind of a status quo or strategic 
agreement with the Islamists. The latter could be tolerated and incorporated to a 
certain degree into the electoral game but on the condition that they accept the 
true rules of the game, that is, the unchallenged monopoly of political power by 
the ruling elites. In exchange, the Islamists could invest in civil society, develop 
their social activities, impose their sartorial codes such as the niqab for women, etc. 
In short, for the ruling elites the monopoly of the political sphere; for Islamists the 
social one. This arrangement meant that the authoritarian state agreed to abandon 
some of its prerogatives and, moreover, its pretention to overall social control. But 
this self mutilation was functional in a global context of state disengagement and 
reorganization as a consequence of neo-liberal reforms. As a result, Islamist move-
ments, everywhere in the Arab world and even in Sub-Saharan Muslim countries 
have invested in the social fields abandoned by the state such as health, housing, 
education; they have replaced the state in supplying services, especially among the 
poorest parts of the population, thus maintaining certain elements of social welfare. 
From this point of view, Islamist movements have proven to be entirely compatible 
with the so-called Washington consensus. Their commitment to economic libera-
lism expresses the emergence of a “market islam” (islam de marché) in the words of 
Patrick Haenni (2005).
With regard to the general weakness and lack of organization of the secular forces, 
the electoral rise of Islamist movements is not really surprising; to a certain extent, 
it is even logical. This rise also underscores another fact: the incapacity of Arab 
authoritarian regimes to contain Islamism. The firm anti-Islamist stance of these 
regimes was and still is sometimes at the core of their self legitimizing rhetoric, 
especially since September 11/ 2001. It is in the name of anti-Islamism that they 
could justify the lack of political freedom and negotiate for international supports 
from which they have benefited. The Islamist electoral successes have proven that 
this was an illusion. These authoritarian regimes were not only unable to contain 
Islamism but, to the contrary, were the best propagandist of the Islamists by letting 
them appear as the only credible and organized opposition. Western democracies 
that supported these regimes in the name of anti-terrorism should realize now that 
their support was not only indecent with regard to their values but that it was also 
unproductive.
This, of course, does not prejudge of the future of Arab uprisings: will they give 
birth to democracies or turn into theocracies? No one can say today as things 
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remain very uncertain. One of the scenarios often mentioned by observers and 
some Arab intellectuals is an Arab version of the Turkish model based on the 
transformation of Islamist movements like the Muslim Brothers, Ennahda or the 
Justice and Development Party in Morocco into moderate Islamic conservative 
parties like the AK Party in Turkey. It is doubtless that Turkey today is a poli-
tical and ideological reference for many Muslim countries not only in the Arab 
world but also in Africa South of the Sahara, because of the AK Party capability 
to apparently reconcile modernity with Islamic values and norms. The question 
is to what extent is the comparison relevant. Does any Arab country dispose of 
the range of assets that made it possible for Turkey to appear as an emerging 
country on the international level and a political model for its neighbours? But 
whatever may be the future, there is no doubt that Arab Islamists have been rou-
ghly confronted with the exercise of power. It is easier to be in the opposition and 
to criticize than to have to take decisions, especially as those who elected them 
were expecting a lot from them and mainly, the restoration of public morality and 
the fight against corruption along with economic and social better being. These 
claims played a crucial role in the Arab uprisings. Thanks to their ostentatious 
attachment to religion, the Islamists were perceived as their most sincere and 
resolute defenders and we can suppose that it is still largely so in many Arab 
countries. But Islamists who aspire to power have to accept to be accountable for 
their acts: this is what democracy means.
The Weakening of Traditional Schemes of Authority
As everyone noticed, youth and women played a major if not a central role in the 
Arab popular uprisings, thus questioning the resilience of traditional schemes of 
authority. What does the mobilization of these junior social actors tell us on Arab 
and Muslim societies and on the systems of inequality and domination that organi-
ze them? What does it tell us about the patterns of authority in the domestic sphere 
and the relationship to political obedience and authoritarianism?
Before entering this discussion, a preliminary remark: the visibility of youth and 
women during these uprisings seems to have induced a radical though maybe 
short-lived change in the Western perception of these two categories of actors. Un-
til then and as a consequence of September 11th, young Muslims were perceived as 
constituting the fighting cohorts of Al-Qaeda and Islamist global terrorism, which 
to some extent evoked the famous dangerous classes of the 19th Century! Thanks 
to these uprisings, the same young Muslims are now considered as the leading de-
mocratic force and the most open one in Muslim and Arab societies to westernized 
way of life and values, and to the dynamics of globalization including the internet, 
social networks, twitter and so on. I don’t think that any of these two perceptions is 
fully well-founded but they deserve to be thought about.
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But whatever may be the relevance of these perceptions, there is no doubt that the 
increasing visibility of youth and women in the public sphere underlines the deep 
changes that have for years been affecting the traditional schemes of authority and 
the family structures in Muslim and Arab societies. Briefly, many of these societies 
have achieved what demographers call the demographic transition, i.e. the passage 
from very high birth rates and rates of mortality to Western figures of birth and 
mortality: in the 1970, Arab women’s fertility was of 7 to 8 children; It is now of 
2,0 in Tunisia, 2,4 in Morocco, 1,7 in Lebanon, 2,3 in Bahrain, the same as in Iran 
and Turkey. These rates are a little higher in Egypt (3,25), in Syria (3,5) or in Jordan 
(3,6) (Courbage and Todd, 2007: 66). It took two centuries to Europe to achieve its 
demographic transition and only four decades for Arab countries to do the same! 
The consequences of these changes have not always been fully measured, espe-
cially with regard to their effects on family structures: Briefly, by considerably re-
ducing the size of the family, the decrease of birth rates has also destabilized its 
internal hierarchies based on the authority of the father – the patriarch – and the 
elder son. At the same time, the greater access to education by girls challenges gen-
der hierarchies while the general rise of education levels affects the generational 
hierarchies. In a word, the family patriarchal order is seriously undermined and 
new figures of authority are emerging. From a scientific point of view, these chan-
ges are crucial insofar as they raise new issues and question our analyses of Mus-
lim and Arab societies. To take only two examples, these changes represent a clear 
reconsideration of some anthropological explanations of political authoritarianism 
in the Arab world, such as Hisham Sharabi’s (1988) elaboration of the concept of 
neo-patriarchy or Abdallah Hammoudi’s (2001) study of the relationship between 
master and disciple and their transposition from the domestic or religious sphere to 
the political one. As a result, more emphasis should be put on the processes of in-
dividualization and “subjectification” at work in Muslim and Arab societies. More 
attention from policy makers and researchers should be given to these dynamics, 
to youth and women as actors of social change, and to the way Muslim perceptions 
and practices are changing. In Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, Benjamin Soares 
and I, following specialists of Islam in the Arab world such as Patrick Haenni and 
Tjistke Holtrop (2002), put forward the concept of Islam mondain in French, which 
can be translated as Islam in the present world as a way to relativize the centrality 
of approaches focusing on Islamism and to get to the complexity of social changes 
in the Muslim world. To get back to the Arab popular uprisings, they certainly have 
more to do with the individual’s changing relation to authority than with Islamism 
even if the Islamists have appropriated them. But the paradox of the Arab uprisings 
is that they bring together the idea of the subject and the activation of feelings of 
belonging, thus raising the issue of cultural pluralism and its regulation. This is the 
fourth and final part of these reflections.
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Democracy and Cultural Pluralism: A Tentative Comparison between Africa and 
the Arab World
To introduce this discussion, a prefatory statement is required: this statement is 
about the apparent relation between the downfall of authoritarian regimes and the 
rise or even the exacerbation of ethnic or religious claims. This was the case in 
Africa south of the Sahara after the democratic transitions of the 1990’s and it is the 
same now in the Arab world as the question of minorities comes to the top of the 
political agenda, in Egypt where the Copts think they are discriminated against by 
the Muslim majority and feel more and more afraid with the rise of the Muslim Bro-
thers and the salafis, in Syria where the crisis is perceived as a conflict between the 
Alaouite minority, backed by other confessional minorities like the Druzes and the 
Christians, and the vast Sunni majority, in Iraq where the federal system has not – 
but is it really surprising? – eased the antagonism between the three major groups, 
the Xia, the Sunnis and the Kurds. 
At this point, maybe is it necessary to recall three things often neglected or forgo-
tten.
First, the apparent relation between democratic transitions and the resurgence of 
identity politics does not imply any nostalgia for authoritarian regimes. Second, 
the current recurrence of ethnic or religious mobilizations in Africa or in the Arab 
world is a reminder of the fact that these two regions are diverse and that it is an 
abuse of language to talk of one Africa or one Arab world. Finally the idea that 
heterogeneity is not the privilege of African or Arab or Asian societies, unless we 
implicitly think that heterogeneity is a stigma characterizing the “traditional” or 
even “primitive” societies of the South, by opposition to the homogeneous modern 
societies of the North. Even these societies witness complex dynamics of heteroge-
neity and many of them are pluralistic while being also democratic. So the problem 
is not pluralism in itself but its regulation and the question is not the compatibility 
of democracy with cultural pluralism but how politics and institutions affect collec-
tive identities and how collective identities interact with politics and institutions.
Much has been said and written on ethnicity in Africa while the issue of minorities 
in the Arab World, though until recently overshadowed by the ideological preva-
lence of Arab nationalism, was assessed with regard to authoritarianism and the 
Khaldounian concept of Assabiyya as reformulated, for example, by the late French 
researcher Michel Seurat (2012). This issue is so huge that it sounds more realistic 
to concentrate on three points: the strategic use of the majority principle; the regula-
tion of cultural pluralism as a political and not necessarily a democratic constraint; 
and the limits of power sharing formulas.
The majority principle refers to the politics of unanimity conducted for decades by 
authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world. In both cases, the 
accent was put on national unity as the only way to build the nation and to enter 
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modernity. National identity was the only legitimate one and it couldn’t cope with 
any other identity, religious, ethnic, tribal or regional. But in fact, the rhetoric of 
national unity was often the way to legitimize the domination of a group on the 
others: either the domination of a majority group on the minority (the Arabs versus 
the Kabyle/Berbers in Algeria), or the domination of a minority group on the other 
groups: the Sunnis in Iraq until the end of Saddam Hussein or the Alaouites in Syria. 
By using the concept of Assabiyya, Michel Seurat argued very convincingly that 
the ruling elites in these two countries came from minority assabiyyat and used the 
ba’athist ideology to legitimize their domination and make it normal and unquestio-
nable insofar as the Arab identity to which the regime claimed its commitment had 
vocation to transcend any other identity, religious, sectarian, ethnic or linguistic. 
The same logic could be seen elsewhere in the Arab world: in Bahrain, where the 
Sunni minority imposes its domination on the Xia majority, in Sudan where the 
Northern political and religious elites tempted for years to impose their Arab and 
Islamic values and norms on the South.
In Africa South of the Sahara, where it was difficult if not impossible to impose the 
majority principle, partly because there was no ideology such as Pan-Arabism, it 
was the figure of the nation that was supposed to abolish and replace any other 
alternative identity. But the logic was the same as in the Arab world in the sense 
that the postcolonial state claimed to fight against ethnicity while it was contami-
nated by ethnic cleavages and competition, thus often driving politics to a zero sum 
game. This is to say that violence may be a structural component of authoritarian 
rule but its price may sometimes be too high, bringing into necessity negotiated 
forms of regulation.
Actually, the regulation of pluralism is a permanent negotiation between actors 
with unequal access to resources, a system of interactions made of constraints and 
opportunities. Moreover, regulation must be considered as a process, a technology 
of power which, from this perspective, is not identified with any political regime, 
democratic or not, in particular. Thus, to regulate is not a matter of democratic con-
viction but a strategic necessity aiming at reducing the political cost of domination, 
stabilizing the regime by bringing to it social supports, and channelling identity 
claims. With very few exceptions, all Arab and African authoritarian regimes have 
put in place various forms and procedures of regulation, either by co-opting pro-
minent or highly symbolic figures from the other groups, or by building trans-com-
munitarian networks based on common economic interests. This was the case in 
Saddam’s Iraq at its peak and this is the case in Assad’s Syria. In Africa South of the 
Sahara, this politics is known as the politics of regional balance, defined as the ca-
pacity of the authoritarian regime to incorporate figures of the main ethno-regional 
groups in order to reduce centrifugal pressures and to give the appearance of so-
cial and political consensus. Côte d’Ivoire under FXB and Cameroon until now are 
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exemplary cases of this mode of regulation which, of course, is ultimately a system 
of inclusion and exclusion, with insiders and outsiders. This mode of regulation 
may of course have advantages as far as it prevents ties of blood to degenerate into 
rivers of blood, to put it like D. Horowitz (1984: 684), but it must not be confused 
with power sharing while it is only limited association with power.
From this point of view, the available institutional frameworks like federalism and 
a consociational system may organize power sharing and peaceful competition for 
power in plural societies. It is thus not surprising that these formulas appear very 
seductive in the context of democratic transitions. Federalism already exists in Afri-
ca, mainly in Nigeria and Ethiopia, though there are significant differences between 
the two models, and Iraq has been experiencing it for some years now, with its 
own specificities. Lebanon is in the Arab world the only case of consociational de-
mocracy based on the unequal access to power of the 18 different religious groups 
officially recognised. It would be interesting to analyse each case and to evaluate 
its political efficiency but I prefer to insist on the idea that there is no ideal system. 
A power sharing system is not necessarily the solution and a majority based one 
does not inevitably lead to tyranny. In Nigeria, federalism was conceived as a way 
to stabilize the country but it has resulted in the exacerbation of local identities. 
Moreover, federalism seems unable to prevent the hardening of religious and sec-
tarian conflicts, and to oppose Boko Haram. In Iraq, federalism, a solution largely 
imposed by the United States, has identically exacerbated the cleavages between 
Sunnis, Xia and Kurds. So is the case with Lebanon where, as we know, the con-
sociational system did not prevent the civil war that the country faced from 1975 
to 1990. What these three examples suggest is that a power sharing system may 
have effects totally opposed to those which are expected, and mainly a hardening 
rather than a softening of cultural cleavages. But separation is not necessarily the 
alternative solution. In Sudan, the independence of the South, strongly supported 
by what is called the international community, was perhaps inevitable but it still 
has not led to peace with the North. Whatever the system may be, its efficiency 
ultimately depends on the will of people to live together and on the elite’s capacity 
to compromise. This is true for Arab and African countries but it is also true for our 
European countries where recent events show that even elites who are supposed to 
have a strong democratic culture are not always ready to compromise.
These popular uprisings were largely unpredicted by political scientists though 
some of them pointed the growing social, economic and political unrest in many 
parts of the Arab world during the recent years. While their outcome remains un-
certain. This round table aims at addressing some theoretical and epistemological 
questions posed to political science by Arab revolutions, in the light of African de-
mocratic transitions, likely to suggest useful analytical elements for a better unders-
tanding of the future of these revolutions.
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The outcomes of Arab popular uprisings remain deeply uncertain as is the pers-
pective of an authentic democratization. From this point of view, it is interesting 
to note that, despite the hopes expressed by many Arab and non-Arab observers, 
the “domino effect” of these uprisings proved to be limited and many Arab autho-
ritarian regimes were not concerned by this wave or succeeded in neutralizing po-
litical and social contestation. Indeed this capability poses new questions to social 
sciences and underlines once again the resilience of Arab authoritarianism. Never-
theless, these uprisings have disqualified once for all the idea of an Arab or Muslim 
authoritarian exceptionalism. At the same time, they question the way social scien-
ces, and mainly political science, have until now approached the issues of political 
change, authoritarianism, or democracy and democratization in the Arab world. It 
is more than time now for political science to draw theoretical and epistemological 
lessons from these uprisings.
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